backport fixes to releases-v4 (#2524)

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Aiqiao Yan 2026-07-16 15:43:47 -04:00 committed by GitHub
parent c915c33a16
commit 11d5960a32
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3 changed files with 144 additions and 19 deletions

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@ -12,15 +12,24 @@ const gitHubWorkspace = path.resolve('/checkout-tests/workspace')
// Inputs for mock @actions/core
let inputs = {} as any
// Replicate @actions/core getInput behavior: it trims whitespace by default
// (String.prototype.trim(), which strips characters such as a leading U+FEFF BOM)
// unless trimWhitespace is explicitly set to false.
const getInputImpl = (name: string, options?: {trimWhitespace?: boolean}) => {
const val = inputs[name] ?? ''
if (options && options.trimWhitespace === false) {
return val
}
return typeof val === 'string' ? val.trim() : val
}
// Shallow clone original @actions/github context
let originalContext = {...github.context}
describe('input-helper tests', () => {
beforeAll(() => {
// Mock getInput
jest.spyOn(core, 'getInput').mockImplementation((name: string) => {
return inputs[name]
})
jest.spyOn(core, 'getInput').mockImplementation(getInputImpl as any)
// Mock error/warning/info/debug
jest.spyOn(core, 'error').mockImplementation(jest.fn())
@ -141,8 +150,76 @@ describe('input-helper tests', () => {
expect(settings.commit).toBeFalsy()
})
it('does not reclassify a ref as sha when a BOM is prefixed', async () => {
// A fork branch named "<U+FEFF>" + 40 hex chars. core.getInput trims the
// BOM by default, which previously collapsed this into a bare SHA and
// bypassed the unsafe fork PR checkout guard.
inputs.ref = '\uFEFF522d932fae5296da51fdf431934425ecf891c6a2'
const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
expect(settings.commit).toBeFalsy()
expect(settings.ref).toBe('522d932fae5296da51fdf431934425ecf891c6a2')
})
it('treats a sha surrounded by ascii whitespace as a commit', async () => {
// ASCII whitespace can only come from the workflow author's YAML (git ref
// names cannot contain it), so trimming it and treating the value as a
// commit is safe.
inputs.ref = ' 1111111111222222222233333333334444444444 '
const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
expect(settings.ref).toBeFalsy()
expect(settings.commit).toBe('1111111111222222222233333333334444444444')
})
it('sets workflow organization ID', async () => {
const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
expect(settings.workflowOrganizationId).toBe(123456)
})
describe('unsafe PR checkout guard', () => {
const forkPayload = {
repository: {id: 100},
pull_request: {
head: {
sha: '1234567890123456789012345678901234567890',
repo: {id: 200, full_name: 'attacker/fork'}
},
merge_commit_sha: 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa'
}
}
it('allows the default self-checkout on a fork pull_request_target', async () => {
const originalEvent = github.context.eventName
const originalPayload = github.context.payload
const originalSha = github.context.sha
try {
github.context.eventName = 'pull_request_target'
github.context.payload = forkPayload as any
// Simulate a rebase/fast-forward merge where the base tip (event SHA)
// equals the PR head SHA. The default self-checkout must still succeed.
github.context.sha = '1234567890123456789012345678901234567890'
const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
expect(settings.commit).toBe('1234567890123456789012345678901234567890')
} finally {
github.context.eventName = originalEvent
github.context.payload = originalPayload
github.context.sha = originalSha
}
})
it('refuses an explicit fork repository on pull_request_target', async () => {
const originalEvent = github.context.eventName
const originalPayload = github.context.payload
try {
github.context.eventName = 'pull_request_target'
github.context.payload = forkPayload as any
inputs.repository = 'attacker/fork'
await expect(inputHelper.getInputs()).rejects.toThrow(
/Refusing to check out fork pull request code/
)
} finally {
github.context.eventName = originalEvent
github.context.payload = originalPayload
}
})
})
})

40
dist/index.js vendored
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@ -1895,6 +1895,23 @@ function getInputs() {
`${github.context.repo.owner}/${github.context.repo.repo}`.toUpperCase();
// Source branch, source version
result.ref = core.getInput('ref');
// core.getInput()'s default trim strips a range of Unicode characters such as a
// leading BOM (U+FEFF) or NBSP (U+00A0). Those are valid in a git ref name, so
// a fork branch named "<BOM>" + 40 hex chars would trim down to a bare SHA and
// be silently reclassified as a commit, bypassing the unsafe fork PR checkout
// guard.
//
// The trim below strips only the ASCII whitespace characters which are all forbidden
// in a git branch name.
// \t U+0009 horizontal tab - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \n U+000A line feed - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \v U+000B vertical tab - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \f U+000C form feed - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \r U+000D carriage return - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// ' ' U+0020 space - forbidden in ref names
const asciiTrimmedRef = core
.getInput('ref', { trimWhitespace: false })
.replace(/^[\t\n\v\f\r ]+|[\t\n\v\f\r ]+$/g, '');
if (!result.ref) {
if (isWorkflowRepository) {
result.ref = github.context.ref;
@ -1907,8 +1924,8 @@ function getInputs() {
}
}
// SHA?
else if (result.ref.match(/^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/)) {
result.commit = result.ref;
else if (asciiTrimmedRef.match(/^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/)) {
result.commit = asciiTrimmedRef;
result.ref = '';
}
core.debug(`ref = '${result.ref}'`);
@ -1986,12 +2003,19 @@ function getInputs() {
(core.getInput('allow-unsafe-pr-checkout') || 'false').toUpperCase() ===
'TRUE';
core.debug(`allow unsafe PR checkout = ${result.allowUnsafePrCheckout}`);
unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository,
ref: result.ref,
commit: result.commit,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
});
// The default self-checkout (this repository with no explicit ref) always
// resolves to the trusted ref/commit GitHub set for the triggering event, so
// the fork-checkout guard only needs to run when the caller customized the
// repository or ref.
const isDefaultCheckout = isWorkflowRepository && !core.getInput('ref');
if (!isDefaultCheckout) {
unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository,
ref: result.ref,
commit: result.commit,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
});
}
return result;
});
}

View file

@ -59,6 +59,23 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
// Source branch, source version
result.ref = core.getInput('ref')
// core.getInput()'s default trim strips a range of Unicode characters such as a
// leading BOM (U+FEFF) or NBSP (U+00A0). Those are valid in a git ref name, so
// a fork branch named "<BOM>" + 40 hex chars would trim down to a bare SHA and
// be silently reclassified as a commit, bypassing the unsafe fork PR checkout
// guard.
//
// The trim below strips only the ASCII whitespace characters which are all forbidden
// in a git branch name.
// \t U+0009 horizontal tab - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \n U+000A line feed - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \v U+000B vertical tab - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \f U+000C form feed - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \r U+000D carriage return - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// ' ' U+0020 space - forbidden in ref names
const asciiTrimmedRef = core
.getInput('ref', {trimWhitespace: false})
.replace(/^[\t\n\v\f\r ]+|[\t\n\v\f\r ]+$/g, '')
if (!result.ref) {
if (isWorkflowRepository) {
result.ref = github.context.ref
@ -72,8 +89,8 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
}
}
// SHA?
else if (result.ref.match(/^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/)) {
result.commit = result.ref
else if (asciiTrimmedRef.match(/^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/)) {
result.commit = asciiTrimmedRef
result.ref = ''
}
core.debug(`ref = '${result.ref}'`)
@ -168,12 +185,19 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
'TRUE'
core.debug(`allow unsafe PR checkout = ${result.allowUnsafePrCheckout}`)
unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository,
ref: result.ref,
commit: result.commit,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
})
// The default self-checkout (this repository with no explicit ref) always
// resolves to the trusted ref/commit GitHub set for the triggering event, so
// the fork-checkout guard only needs to run when the caller customized the
// repository or ref.
const isDefaultCheckout = isWorkflowRepository && !core.getInput('ref')
if (!isDefaultCheckout) {
unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository,
ref: result.ref,
commit: result.commit,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
})
}
return result
}